Scope of CTM

The most obvious domain for CTM is that of occurrent propositional attitude state - that is, states that occur at some specific moment in a person's mental life, and the sort of content that might be expressed by a propositional phrase.

CTM(Computation theory of mind)最明顯的就範圍包含對命題的研究，而命題態度的事件是指某人在特定狀況下的心理歷程。

Here we perhaps have the most plausible case of mental states that might be grounded in something like token mental representations.

心理狀態包含很多東西，就例如像個例心理表徵物。

Within this class of occurrent states, we may additionally distinguish between the kinds of states that occur in explicit, conscious judgments and mental states that are not conscious because they take place at a "level of processing" that is too low to be brought to conscious awareness.

那些東西發生在某些時刻裡，我們可能會因此將它們和出現在特殊時刻的心理狀態區分開。意識的判斷和心理狀態是完全不同的，他們在不同層次裡運作不同的工作，因而我們可以區別哪些是較低層次的意識思考。

However, advocates of CTM often speak of it more generally as an account of beliefs and desires which are then cased out in dispositional rather than occurrent terms. Such states are arguably more problematic for CTM than occurrent states, as there are many things one might be thought to "believe" or "desire" in the dispositional senses of those terms, but which could not plausibly be supposed to be explicitly represented in the form of a symbol token.

信念以及欲望，比較像屬於傾向而不只是表面上的詞而已。對於這類研究，CTM還是被受爭議和討論的理論，由其像是研究"相信"和"想要"這類有傾向意思的詞。不過這並不能假設說，我們用這類詞的個例表徵了那些特定心理狀態。Somehow我們確實在某些時刻會有傾向去相信和想要某些對象，卻不能反向推論。

An additional issue regarding the intended scope of the theory is that of how comprehensive an account of mental states and processes it is intended to be.

Advocates of CTM and critics alike have often assumed that CTM makes claims to be a quite general account of reasoning. This is complicated, however, by Fodor's [1984] distinction between "modular' and "global" mental processes, and his judgment (in Fodor [2000]) that it is only the former that are likely to be computational in the classic sense.

CTM企圖做出普遍和可以模組化的心理歷程。

While this view has struck some readers as surprising, Fodor claims that, while advocating the truth of CTM since the 1970's, it "hadn't occurred to [him] that anyone could think that it's a very large part of the truth; still less that it's within miles of being the whole story about how the mind works."

到1970年為止，CTM都還不算是能夠說服那些解釋心理歷程的理論，因為它說明的還不夠多。

We may therefore refine questions about the truth of CTM to questions about its truth as a theory of particular kinds of mental processes.